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This article examines the embrace of  Chinese finance under the UK’s 2010-2015 Coalition government. The article
argues that the City of  London’s centrality within British capitalism has been reinforced, not displaced, since the
Global Financial Crisis. Geo-economic rebalancing towards China, not the Coalition’s professed spatial and sectoral
‘rebalancing’ ambitions, prevailed. To explain the City’s renewed pre-eminence in the wake of  the crisis, the article
draws upon a modified version of  the ‘City-Bank-Treasury nexus’ theory of  British capitalism. Breaking from
structuralist approaches that underplay the City of  London Corporation’s role within economic policy making, the
article illuminates the Corporation’s agency as a key para-state institution that reoriented the City-Bank-Treasury





   From the early 1990s until 2007, as Western economies experienced sustained low-inflationary economic
growth, the City of  London enjoyed spectacular success. A combination of  global and domestic conditions
placed the City within a propitious conjuncture. Globally, a huge build-up of  foreign savings (the so-called
‘global savings glut’) led investors looking for high yield returns to pour capital in to the City, while
domestically, the New Labour government eagerly sought to accommodate the interests of  the City by
promoting a series of  favourable institutional and regulatory changes.
            The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of  2007/8 interrupted the global trajectory within which the City’s
success was framed. The aftershocks of  the crisis, and the recession that followed, gave rise to a distinctive set
of  political-economic conditions. How has the City’s role changed within this new post-crisis era? 
[i]
 This
article argues that the City of  London’s status within British capitalism has been reinforced, rather than
diluted, in the years since the Global Financial Crisis. Despite public anger with stricken financial institutions
and the Coalition government’s professed commitment to regional and sectoral rebalancing (Berry & Hay,
2016), the post-crisis conjuncture witnessed the continuation of  a traditional concentration of  institutional
power: the City-Bank-Treasury nexus. This occurrence owes much to a very different kind of  rebalancing. In
practice, the central form of  rebalancing under the Coalition government was of  a geo-economic nature. It
centred upon a long-term strategy to enable the financial services firms of  the City of  London to tap into
new business opportunities presented by Chinese currency internationalisation. The City’s new pivot to China
has involved combined efforts by a wider network of  institutional actors: the City of  London Corporation,
the Bank of  England, the Treasury, and major UK-based international banks. Acting in concert, these
institutions have reinforced the centrality of  the City within the commanding heights of  British economic
policy. In terms of  the prevailing finance-dependent orientation of  the UK growth model (Hay, 2013;
Thompson, 2013), then, the post-crisis period represents continuity. But within the dominant institutional
configuration of  that model, the City Corporation’s intensified global lobbying and market-making function
regarding Asia denotes an important change from its more reactive pre-crisis role. Given the challenges of
Brexit, this more proactive stance from the Corporation is likely to intensify, as the wider City of  London
attempts both to redefine its relationship to the EU and reinforce its commitment to emerging Asian financial
markets. Conceptually, the article addresses important gaps within existing literature on the City-Bank-
Treasury nexus by examining the subnational agency of  the City of  London Corporation as an exceptional
local authority that weaves together private financial interests with public institutions of  government.
Empirically, the article draws on policy documents from the City Corporation and data from semi-structured
elite interviews with the City of  London Corporation’s Special Advisor for Asia, Sherry Madera, and an
anonymous UK government official.
[ii]
            In the first section, the article builds conceptually upon scholarship on the City’s entrepôt role and
offshore orientation, identifying the City’s sensitivity to changes in the international monetary order. The
second section examines renminbi internationalisation of  within the post-crisis international monetary order.
In the third section, the article breaks from traditional structuralist approaches to the City-Bank-Treasury
nexus by framing the unique political agency of  the City of  London Corporation as a para-state institution. In
the fourth section, the article examines the role of  the City-Bank-Treasury nexus in embracing Chinese
currency liberalisation and reasserting the national predominance of  financial services. Finally, the article
concludes by addressing the continuing centrality of  the City within British capitalism and assessing what
clues the geo-economic rebalancing towards China under the Coalition might offer for understanding Britain’s
post-Brexit economic prospects.
           
 
The City’s entrepôt role and British development
 
 
The importance of  the City of  London’s role within British capitalism has been the subject broad scholarly
interest (McRae & Cairncross, 1973; Longstreth, 1979; Ingham, 1984; Plender & Wallace, 1985; Augar, 2000;
Roberts & Kynaston, 2001; Kynaston, 2011; Norfield, 2016). These authors have drawn attention to the City’s
international significance, its influence upon the historical development of  British capitalism, and the notion
of  a longstanding tension between the City and manufacturing industry.
Within these diverse accounts, the most authoritative theorisation of  the City remains Geoffrey
Ingham’s (1984) Capitalism Divided. According to Ingham, the City’s status arose from its ‘near monopolisation’
of  commercial activities based on international economic exchanges. This accorded the City a central role
within the world economy, acting as an entrepôt: a spatial zone through which international commercial flows
of  trade and credit could be mediated (Ingham, 1988: 47).
[iii]
 The City performed this role with a global reach
during the nineteenth century owing to sterling’s status as world money (Ingham, 1988: 53).
            Sterling’s international standing declined sharply after WWII. But this did not undermine the City’s
international status. Beginning with the emergence of  the Eurodollar market from 1957, the City’s banks
incorporated business services and transactions denominated in foreign currency. Facing restrictions on the
use of  sterling, British merchant banks turned to dollars deposited by Soviet officials fearing requisition of
assets held in the US. To achieve this, the City developed a new ‘offshore’ accountancy category.
[iv]
 Offshore
embedded a sovereign bifurcation within the City: onshore activities and entries were subject to national
financial regulations, while offshore transactions, conversely, fell outside the national regulatory remit and
within a laissez-faire order of  self-regulation spatially within but juridically beyond the post-war Keynesian state
infrastructure of  financial control (Palan, 2006: 27-32).
            Offshore subsequently became an explicit pillar of  British economic policy (Palan, 2006: 33). By
developing an ‘offshore’ regulatory orientation and accountancy technique, the City could perpetuate its
entrepôt role despite the decline of  sterling. Rather than principally mediating flows of  trade and services
denominated in sterling, the City’s institutions now mediated flows of  foreign currencies, particularly dollars, and
provided the services required to mediate flows of trade and capital in these currencies. It was the innovation
of ‘offshore’ finance, then, as an increasingly intentional bifurcation of  national sovereignty, which enabled
the City’s entrepôt role to continue.
            Due to the   City’s   successful ‘offshore’ transformation the predominance of  commercial financial
activities within the City continues today. Financial and related professional services accounted for around 14
per cent of  UK GDP in 2010, compared to a share of  12 per cent for manufacturing (Talani, 2011: 16). By
2015, the gap between the respective shares had closed by 1 per cent, with finance and related professional
services at just under 11 per cent of  UK GVA and manufacturing contributing just below 10 per cent
(TheCityUK, 2017).
This change might give some credence to Coalition success in achieving sectoral rebalancing. The
increased relative share of  manufacturing within GDP vis-à-vis financial services must, though, be interpreted
via important caveats. Firstly, the change is modest and it is unclear that this is anything beyond a short-term
recovery from severe job losses after the crisis (Berry, 2016). While finance and insurance saw a reduction of
around 30,000 (2 per cent) jobs between 2007 and 2013, the manufacturing sector lost around 330,000 jobs
(12 per cent) (Berry & Hay, 2016). Secondly, new jobs created within manufacturing are predominantly low-
skilled and low-productivity. This does not augur well for the prospects of a sustained sectoral rebalancing.
Thirdly, pay levels between the sectors remain extremely imbalanced: while average weekly pay in
manufacturing rose from 13 per cent above the national average in 2007 to 17 per cent in 2013, the figure for
finance and insurance workers increased from over 116 per cent above the national average in 2007, to 119
per cent by 2013 (Berry & Hay, 2016: 16). Finally, a declining share of  British bank lending has been
channelled towards manufacturing since the crisis (Berry & Hay, 2016: 16), suggesting that the longstanding
separation between the City and manufacturing industry continues (Talani, 2011: 16-17). 
The City’s capacity to maintain its domestic and international predominance owes much to what
Talani (2011: 18-19), following Longstreth (1979: 159), calls ‘pragmatic adaptation’: the capacity for
institutional flexibility to accommodate market shifts. The emergence of  offshore as a post-war
developmental strategy is integral to understanding the City’s attempt to reposition itself  within the post-crisis
political economy. Offshore imparts an externally facing cosmopolitan character upon financial institutions
within the City of  London, whose business strategy depends upon mediating flows of  foreign currencies
through international borrowing and lending, foreign exchange dealing, and derivatives trading (Roberts &
Kynaston, 2001: 62-64).  PubMed This orientation transmits transformations in the international monetary
order into the practices and policies of  the City. In the following section, the article examines the changing
post-crisis international monetary order that has presented new strategic opportunities for the City-Bank-
Treasury nexus.




Renminbi internationalisation and the dollar order
 
 
Chinese elites responded to the GFC in a way that will profoundly impact the global political economy.
Before the G20 London summit in March 2009, Chinese Central Bank Governor Zhou Xiaochuan called
for reform of the international monetary system and an increased role for alternatives to the dollar.   This
was a crucial symbolic moment: it represented the first public announcement that Chinese elites had
begun to question their reliance upon the dollar and look for strategies to reduce dollar-dependency (Chin
& Yong, 2010: 4).  
China’s concerns pre-date the crisis and reflect the longer-term growth of  Sino- American interdependence.
As early as the 1997/8 Asian financial crisis, Chinese elites became increasingly concerned by the
instabilities of the dollar-centred international monetary order (Chin, 2013: 187).  China’s export-led
growth over many decades has been extraordinarily dependent upon the American export market,
leading Chinese governments to hold vast trade surpluses in the form of dollar-denominated assets (Saull,
2012: 326). That exposure to dollar-assets makes China extremely vulnerable to fluctuations in the dollar’s
value and has prompted concerns in China about breaking this dependency (Chin & Yong, 2010: 4).  One
solution is to promote the internationalisation of  the RMB as a regional and, ultimately, international trade,
accounting, and reserve currency.
Steps to liberalise the RMB and promote international use are well under way: China has established
large currency swap arrangements with several economies, signed agreements with Russia and Brazil to
encourage trade settlements in each other’s currencies (thus bypassing the dollar), and promoted the holding
of bank deposits and bond issuances (so-called ‘Dim Sum’ bonds) in Hong Kong.   By 2020, Chinese
officials want Shanghai to become an international financial centre (Mallaby & Wethington, 2012; Chin,
2013). These ambitions were given a major boost by the IMF’s November 2015 decision to add the RMB to
its basket of  reserve currencies, signifying its growing international status (Talley, 2015).  China has a l s o
turned its attention towards the major European financial centres, a key step towards promoting the
RMB beyond its East Asian homeland. Chinese authorities and bankers found willing partners for this
project in the Coalition government and the City of  London.  The supply-side of  Chinese intentions to
internationalise the flow of  RMB assets has been paired with a demand-side effort from the City-Bank-
Treasury nexus geared towards establishing RMB business in London by creating offshore market
infrastructure.
The City’s offshore orientation and expertise position it to benefit from RMB internationalisation.
Added to this, the political and economic uncertainty as Britain moves towards Brexit has thrown London’s
status as the major offshore euro trading hub into doubt (Thompson, 2017). With increased uncertainty
over the dollar’s long-term future and considerable uncertainty over the City’s continued predominance as an
offshore centre for the euro, the global conjuncture has heightened the appeal of  emergent RMB
opportunities. China’s post-crisis policy priorities have opened new global developmental spaces for the
City’s business practices.
Yet the receptiveness of  the City and the UK government to Chinese currency internationalisation
cannot be explained wholly in terms of  the changing international monetary order or the structural
orientation of  the City towards offshore financial development. To understand why and how this has
happened we need to examine the dominant institutions of  post-crisis British capitalism and the specific
forms of  political agency that led the City and the Coalition government to embrace RMB
internationalisation. In the following section, a modified conceptualisation of  the City-Bank-Treasury nexus
is outlined as a basis for understanding the UK’s geo-economic rebalancing towards Chinese finance.
 
 
Disaggregating the City of  London
 
 
Traditional scholarship on the City’s influence within Britain has drawn attention to important cultural,
personal, and structural-functional linkages between the private firms of  the City, on one hand, and the key
fiscal and monetary institutions of  the state, on the other. Economic historians coined the concept of
‘gentlemanly capitalism’ (Cain and Hopkins: 1986, 1987, 2014)  PubMed to capture the close cultural,
economic, and political interest alignments that developed between the landed aristocracy, the emergent
financial services sector based in London, and key state institutions from the late 17th century. Political
economists have theorised these linkages through the more systematically oriented ‘City-Bank-Treasury
nexus’. Frank Longstreth’s (1979: 161) influential work on the subject identifies two main ways in which the
City’s dominance was articulated within the wider state. Firstly, in a direct manner, through the Bank of
England and the Treasury, ‘thus securing a direct voice in the formulation of  economic policy’. The second
(and more important) channel for maintaining influence in the British state, was the central significance of  its
role within the economy. The City’s pre-eminence within national policy was due to both a direct penetration
of  government agencies and a wider structural context of  determinative influence within the economy.
            In a similar vein to Longstreth, Ingham (1984) draws attention to the structural connections between
the City, the Bank, and the Treasury. By the late nineteenth century, the relationship between these three
poles had become a ‘relatively integrated system of  interdependencies, in which the practices of  any one
institution were dependent upon conditions provided by the others’ (Ingham, 1984: 131). These institutional
interdependencies were reinforced by cultural cross-fertilisations between government offices and City
institutions, with both staffed by members of  the public school and Oxbridge elites.
            Focusing upon the City-Bank-Treasury nexus helps us apprehend the systematic interdependencies
between private and public finance within Britain, illuminating both the historical failure of  British industrial
revitalisation (owing to industry’s relative exclusion from the state) and the enduring orientation of  Britain’s
economy towards promotion of  financial services (owing to structural connections between private finance
and public power). But the approach has been criticised. Roberts and Kynaston (2001:17) suggest that,
‘notions of  an automatic, smooth-working ‘nexus’ are wide of the mark’. This critique of  the implied
structural automaticity within the nexus is well placed. But their alternative stress on the role of ‘markets’
rather than ‘players’ in shaping government policy, does little to advance beyond a vague sense of  structural
interdependency. Greater awareness of  how institutional agency articulates and rearticulates interests and
policy orientations within the nexus is required.
 Common to the work on the City is a clear structural-functionalist bias that stresses an institutionally
determined ‘nexus’ of  interests between private finance and the state. Longstreth’s (1979) account views the
state as essentially captive to a dominant fraction of banking capital. For Ingham (1984), the connections are
more clearly specified and historicised, but they amount to a similar underpinning of  mutual interests,
functional interdependency, and shared social habitus. More recent scholarship similarly points to the
existence of, ‘dialectical relationships of  mutual interest between the City and its political referents’ (Talani,
2011: 19). Echoing Longstreth’s sense of  banking capital’s ‘capture’ of the state, Talani (2011: 19) suggests
that the City’s successful strategy of  pragmatic adaptation depends upon, ‘flexibility and direct control of the
levers of  economic policy making and regulation’, and particularly a ‘very close relationship’, with the Bank
and the Treasury.
            Structural linkages between the financial institutions of  the City, the Treasury, and the Bank of
England do matter. The Bank's role in managing monetary policy ensures a deep structural connection to
private banks: setting overnight borrowing rates and holding bank reserves on its accounts. Similarly, the
dependency of government gilt markets upon purchases by major private financial institutions create
functional fiscal interdependence. But an exclusively structural approach privileges explanation of  continuity
over change, and of  technical process over policy formation.
[v]
 It does not reveal how the nexus is
reproduced over time, how institutions and interests might vary in response to common external shocks, or
how such a nexus can incorporate distinctive and temporally disjunctive processes of  change within each of
the constituent institutional components, while still retaining its overall coherence. In the era of  offshore, the
structural approach provides few clues as to how the nexus forges new geographical and political linkages
with rising financial powers.
Notwithstanding these limitations of  a structural approach, there is clearly a need to understand the
deep-rooted, historical institutional basis for the propagation of  offshore strategies. Path-dependent
mechanisms of  reinforcement, owing to positive feedback effects, help to stabilise offshore development
(Pierson, 2004: 20-21).  PubMed Past investments of  political and economic resources, private and public
interests that depend upon the City’s continuing offshore vitality, and the ongoing profitable business
opportunities it presents to financial firms from around the world all work to reproduce the offshore model.
But the City, and the wider institutional nexus within which it is embedded, is also defined in part by its
capacity to ‘pragmatically adapt’ to changing conditions, particularly during periods of  international crisis,
rather than simply exhibiting linear structural continuity. This indeed, is the secret of its survival, of  its
opportunistic outliving of  the UK’s long-dissolved global economic primacy. To understand the City’s
capacity to adapt requires a fuller sense of  the agential mechanisms that drive the political bargaining and
institutional change associated with adaptive processes. And of  the scope of  strategising and decision making
that imbues the City with its enduring pragmatism in the face of  economic adversity.
            Existing approaches lack a convincing sense of  how private and public-sector agency are
institutionally mediated and combined, dynamically over time, in relation to strategic arenas of  economic
policy. This becomes particularly problematic when we try to explain policy developments regarding the City-
Bank-Treasury nexus, such as the support for RMB internationalisation. This agency deficit in the City-Bank-
Treasury nexus ultimately stems from a failure to properly disaggregate, conceptually, what we mean by the
‘City of  London’. The term is commonly taken to represent the aggregated interests of  financial firms within
London, traditionally the institutions located within the Square Mile, but now Canary Wharf  too. Thus, Talani
(2011: 14-15)  PubMed approaches the definition of  the City by breaking it down into its constituent economic
activities: commerce, banking and finance. Similarly, Roberts and Kynaston (2001: 60) divide the City into
‘mainstream’ and ‘money-centre’ financial services, noting that ‘The City’, as a term, ‘continues to be used as a
shorthand for London’s money-centre activities’.
 Defining the City in these terms has the advantage of  disaggregating the distinctive financial services
that constitute it. But these definitions fail to make a further crucial distinction: between the City of  London
as a spatial zone in which the financial services sector resides, and the City of London Corporation, as a
distinctive political authority responsible for jurisdiction over part of London and for representing the
interests of  the financial services industry. Scholarship on the City has largely neglected to disentangle the two
linked but distinctive meanings of  the City of  London. A notable exception, Nicholas Shaxon’s (2012)
popular work on tax havens has gone some way to illuminating the Corporation’s underappreciated role
within London’s financial sector. But there remain scant references to the Corporation in many major
scholarly works on the City. Kynaston’s (2011) magisterial history of  the City makes almost no reference to
the Corporation, and neither do Longstreth nor Ingham in their seminal theoretical interventions. While more
recent scholarship offers some (limited) recognition of  the City Corporation’s role as a lobbying conduit and
cheerleader for private finance in the pre-crisis period (Engelen, et al., 2011; Morgan, 2012), a more explicit
and sustained investigation of  the political agency and resources of the City Corporation has not been
undertaken.
            The omission of  the Corporation’s role within the wider City is significant. Without a sense of  the
political agency of  the Corporation, mediating and concerting private and public-sector interests nationally
and internationally, traditional accounts are forced to rely upon a sense of  structural, automatic, and systemic
interdependency. A more agent-centred approach requires conceptualising the exceptional historical
institutional features of  the Corporation, before empirically examining its practical efforts to establish
London’s as a centre for offshore RMB business.
Within the UK, the City of  London Corporation is a local authority quite unlike any other. It
performs a special role and wields greater power than comparable authorities. Its responsibilities include
providing local services and policing within the Square Mile, financing charitable donations and economic
regeneration in London, and promotion of  the City as, ‘the world leader in international financial and
business services’ (City Corporation, 2014). It is part local authority and part international lobbyist for the
financial interests of  the City. Indeed, the Corporation’s Special Advisor to Asia acknowledges that the
Corporation is “a bit of  chameleon”, being simultaneously receptive to, and representative of, the interests of
both private and public actors within the UK financial system. The Corporation can shift between these roles
to its advantage. During times of  high-level diplomatic tension between the UK and Chinese governments,
such as the spat over David Cameron’s public meeting with the Dalai Lama in 2012, the Corporation has
achieved a more discrete and depoliticised role. It has been able to conveniently evade fuller association with
the UK government and sustain continued contact and cooperation with Chinese officials. But the
Corporation is, in line with its Chameleon-like capacity to transform its appearance, also treated “very much
as government” when playing other roles in China, which allows it to link financial actors within the City of
London to government regulators and agencies at home and abroad (Madera, 2017).
As such, the Corporation can be thought of  as a ‘para-state’ institution. The term refers to private
jobs funded by the public sector. It reflects the interdependency between the two sectors in contemporary
capitalism (Froud et al. 2011: 17). This provides a useful way of  understanding certain functions performed
by the Corporation: it uses public funding to finance both lobbying activities in the interest of  the City’s
private firms and official UK government interests. Here, then, we use the term not to refer to private
employment funded by taxpayer money, but rather to publicly financed role of  a local authority geared
predominantly towards the promotion of  sectorally-specific private interests facilitated by the political
privileges of  the Corporation.
The Corporation’s distinctive political privileges are linked to its status as the, ‘oldest continuous
democratic commune in the world’, with a constitution that is based in the, ‘ancient rights and privileges’,
citizens enjoyed prior to the Norman Conquest of  1066 (Shaxon, 2012: 255; Glasman, 2014; City of  London,
2015). They exemplify the institutional continuity of  ancient pre-modern political structures within Britain
(Anderson, 1964). London’s importance in terms of  trade, finance, wealth, and population allowed it to win
greater freedoms earlier than other towns and cities in the UK (Plender & Wallace, 1985: 4). Unlike all other
UK local authorities, voting rights for the elected members of  the Corporation’s Court of  Common Council
are given both to residents and businesses, with business representation outnumbering that of individual
residents. The more employees businesses have, the more votes they can wield in the Court (Tax Justice
Network, 2009). The Corporation also has a permanent representative within Parliament, the City
Remembrancer.
[vi]
          Despite its tiny resident population of  just c.7,700 people, the territory of  the City of  London bears
comparison with other major urban local authorities in terms of its contribution to both the London and
wider UK economy. The City of  London, alongside Westminster, generates the most economic output of
any borough in London, estimated at a combined £99.6 billion in Gross Value Added terms in 2014. It
accounts for an income tax total of  c. £7.1 billion, which is equal to 20.5 per cent of  London’s income tax
revenue. This even though the City only employs 9.4 per cent of  London’s workforce (Centre for
Economics and Business Research, 2015: 36).
          The Corporation's unique fiscal status also owes to its huge asset base.  In March 2013, the value of
the Corporation's total cash investment assets stood at £1,827 million, while its Fund reserves stood at
£1,127 million (City Corporation, 2013:4). The Corporation's vast endowment of  private assets makes it
much more self-sufficient than other local authorities. The Cash Account recorded a surplus of  £59.3
million in 2015. Even without a £14.3 million profit on the sale of  fixed assets, the position would still have
been a surplus of  £45 million, compared to a deficit of  £13 million from 2013 to 2014 (City of  London
Corporation, 2015: 5-6).
            Political benefits derived from the Corporation's extraordinary fiscal capacity are clear to see. This
resource base underpins the Corporation's extensive lobbying activities on behalf  of  UK-based financial
services. These include £11.5 million spent on ‘City Representation’ in 2015, supporting the Corporation's key
objective of  promoting the UK-based financial services, and related professional services, at home and
abroad’. As part of  this expenditure, the Lord Mayor of  the City spent around 90 days overseas to promote
trade and forge, ‘links at the highest levels of  government and industry’. A further £2.9 million was spent on
‘Economic Development’, which centred upon building the City’s competitiveness and encouraging market
conditions that encourage ‘enterprise and innovation. This expenditure includes maintenance of  the
Corporation’s Office in Brussels, which helps the City shape Brussels legislation that affects UK-based
financial services and promotes the City of  London's message, ‘to decision makers in Westminster and
Whitehall’. Finally, the expenditure enables the Corporation to lead overseas business delegations and host
high-level foreign visitors in London (City of  London Corporation, 2015: 2-3).
            Taken together, the fiscal power and networked political influence of  the City of London Corporation
have enabled it to articulate the interests of  financial services since the crisis.
[vii]
 The following section
examines the Corporation’s role in driving cooperation between the wider City of  London, the Bank, and the







Reorienting the City- Bank-Treasury nexus
 
 
The Corporation’s distinctive political privileges, para-state identity, and fiscal power provide the institutional
basis for its project to boost London’s RMB business. For pragmatic adaptation to occur, though, the
Corporation must act as an agent, connecting transformations in the international monetary order to the
business strategies of  the UK’s financial services sector and the political priorities of  the Treasury. The
Corporation’s role is part ambassador/networker; drawing together the relevant international players. And
part market-maker: providing a forum in which fine-grained institutional and technical detail of  RMB
internationalisation can be devised. In the post-crisis period, the City has done this through a more active
engagement with emerging Asian markets than in previous years. The Corporation had maintained
representative offices in Mumbai, Shanghai, and Beijing for around ten years, but it was only during the post-
crisis periodthat the role of  these offices changed from a “reactive/sounding board” to “putting them into
action in terms of  really pushing forward…City of  London agendas specifically in those regions” (Madera,
2017).
 Internationally, these activities have strengthened the City’s links to Asian financial markets. But
domestically, they have, by reproducing the centrality of  the City’s entrepôt role, reinforced existing spatial
inequalities within the UK economy. The rebalancing that has occurred is that of  the City towards East Asia,
rather than of  British capitalism towards a more regionally and sectorally diffuse basis of  growth. Explaining
the embrace of  Chinese finance requires us to examine the institutionally discrete forms of  agency at play,
rather than assuming broad structural continuity and systemic interdependency within the City-Bank-Treasury
nexus.
            In April 2012, the Corporation launched its ‘RMB initiative’: intended to develop practical measures to
support London’s development as an offshore centre for RMB business. This involves the provision of
leadership to financial markets in relation to the, ‘technical, infrastructure and regulatory issues relevant to the
development of  the RMB product market in London’ (City Corporation, 2012:15). The City Corporation
does not work alone in pursuing these objectives. It has a strategic partnership with ‘TheCityUk’: a private
membership body that champions the UK-based financial and related professional services and lobbies on
behalf  of  the industry to sustain the case for its importance to the wider national economy (TheCityUk:
2015).  
              Beyond its connections to key private actors in financial services, the Corporation draws upon linkages
with the Treasury, the Bank of  England, and other financial stability agencies (including the FSA until its
recent abolition) within the UK. The City Corporation advises HM Treasury on the best way to maximise
London’s ability to ‘trade, clear and settle RMB’, while also giving practical guidance and long term targets for
the future development of the London RMB market. Further to this advisory role to the Treasury, the City
Corporation provides important guidance for the wider UK authorities (including the Bank of  England) over
issues of  financial stability relevant to RMB business (City Corporation, 2013: 15). Institutionally, it is around
this City-Bank-Treasury nexus that the project to boost London’s global RMB role has coalesced.
              How does the demarcation of  authority between the Corporation and other state institutions operate
in practice? There is, unsurprisingly, a clear hierarchy here, with executive power at the apex and central to the
initial activation of Corporation agency. It was the high-level partnership of  Prime Minister Cameron and
Chancellor Osborne that initially endorsed a very strong relationship with China. This opened political space
for the Corporation to operate within (Interviewee A, 2016; Madera, 2017). Osborne’s keen support for closer
ties with China also shifted responsibility for China relations away from the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, centralising Anglo-Chinese governmental linkages around Osborne’s Treasury and strengthening its
status as the paramount government department. Once top-level commitment to deepening Anglo-Chinese
finance ties had been coordinated, the Treasury approached the Corporation and tasked it withsupporting the
promotion of  the RMB in the UK. This involved raising awareness of  RMB business opportunities and
providing advice. Additionally, strategic developmental assistance provided to the People’s Bank of  China and
other Chinese agencies through the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s Prosperity Fund has been used to
bring UK agencies closer to their Chinese counterparts and foster mutual trust and learning (Madera, 2017).
Government endorsement led the Corporation to focus on the infrastructural development of  an
RMB offshore market, using its international networks and para-state identity to work with the London Stock
Exchange, HSBC and Standard Chartered banks, Chinese banks in London, and the Bank of  China to
develop an RMB-market in London (Madera, 2017).
[viii]
 In addition, personal ties between influential British-
based financiers, such as Sir Gerry Grimstone (formerly of  the China Group at City UK and now Deputy
Chairman and Senior Independent Director at Barclays) and Xavier Rolet (a former global investment banker
and now CEO of  the London Stock Exchange), and Chinese stakeholders, played a hugely important role in
building the initial relationships of  trust and mutual support that facilitated early RMB internationalisation
efforts in London (Interviewee A, 2016).
[ix]
Periodic high-level intergovernmental interaction, through the annual UK-China Economic and
Financial Dialogues, has helped cement bilateral relations. But because these Dialogues only occur annually,
much of  the preparatory and follow-up work must be undertaken by the Corporation. This creates a space
for the Corporation to shape the practical details of  UK-China financial integration and sustain cooperative
relationships over time. Similarly, the lack of  market expertise from within the Treasury ensures a high degree
of  epistemic dependency upon the financial know-how of the Corporation and the transnational network of
private sector players that it draws together. Indeed, some Chinese stake-holders, frustrated with what they see
as the slow progress of  the offshore RMB market in London and UK-Chinese financial integration, have
been keen to bypass high-level UK government involvement wherever possible. They prefer to get direct
access to the Corporation and UK financial services to accelerate the pace of  RMB internationalisation in
London (Interviewee A, 2016).
There is, then, a clear reciprocal pattern of  periodic UK-Chinese executive level contact that facilitates
further cooperation at the sub-executive (i.e. Corporation and private sector) level, in turn enabling progress
towards further executive level policy formation. Within this wider process, the Corporation plays the role of
“convenor and facilitator” for major topics agreed upon during the Financial Dialogues (Madera, 2017).
Attempts to promote the City’s role within global RMB business are, therefore, underwritten by state power
and a resuscitation of  the ‘economicpatriotism’ via which the UK government sponsored the City’s global
dominance in the pre-crisis period (Morgan, 2012: 373). The dominant City-Bank-Treasury nexus has actively
and strategically engaged with the opportunities presented by the post-crisis era, with the explicit agenda of
cementing London’s standing within a changing global monetary order. The longstanding lamentation of  the
UK’s underdeveloped industrial policy has tended to overlook the parallel existence of  a long-term and
coordinated approach to promoting financial services. It is not simply that the interests of  the City and (more
historically) sterling, have obfuscated industrial policy, but rather that the strategic and long-term state
engagement with businesses commonly associated with industrial policy in advanced capitalist states is geared
towards the financial sector within the UK. Recent proclamations of  a commitment to a revitalised industrial
policy, from the governments of  Gordon Brown, David Cameron, and now Theresa May, must be interpreted
within this context.
The Corporation plays a key role here in bridging public and private power; it advises the Bank, the
Treasury, and key financial authorities while simultaneously developing and maintaining the private sector
dialogue between private sector players in the UK and regulators based in Honk Kong and Mainland China
(City Corporation, 2013: 15). Thus, even though overall political leadership of deepening ties with China came
from George Osborne’s Treasury, it is the Corporation that transformed this into a unitary project harnessing
private and public sector commitment across the nexus more continuously than the periodic UK-China
executive contacts. Drawing on its unique political powers, international presence, and financial resources, the
City Corporation acts as a go-between agency that meshes together public and private power to further
London’s global offshore role.
Organisationally, the Corporation has been deeply involved in working with industry stake-holders
from the financial services sector, helping to focus investor interest on London, and making sure that the
London RMB market was as “frictionless as possible”. As part of  this process, and after political
endorsement from Cameron and Osborne, the Treasury and the Bank participated as relatively passive
observers within City-led meetings and forums (Madera, 2017). This demonstrates that leadership of  the
process at the detailed day-to-day level of on-the-ground planning was effectively delegated to the
Corporation and industry players.
Through the local power of  the Corporation, and a wider City-Bank-Treasury nexus, global
developmental dynamics are transmitted into British capitalism. This adaptation has not emerged
automatically, as the consequence of  a broad set of  functional interdependencies and common interests, but
because of  concerted political agency in which the Corporation plays a crucial role in linking high-level
political will and episodic inter-governmental contact, with a more continuous orientation that brings together
ground level institutional expertise and private sector participants. Because of  the para-state identity of  the
Corporation, this more continuous orientation can weather the fallout of occasional high-level diplomatic
spats that mark Anglo-Chinese relations.
            In the Treasury and the Bank, the City Corporation and its associated banks have found willing
partners for this project. In 2014, the Bank of  England appointed one of  China’s largest banks as the Chinese
currency-clearing bank in London. This is part of  a wider Anglo-Chinese strategy to make London a hub
forChinese currency dealing, which began with a currency swap agreement between the Bank of  England and
the People’s Bank of  China in 2013. Chancellor Osborne suggested that ‘the emergence of  China’s currency
as one of the world’s leading currencies will be the next huge change’ in the financial world (BBC, 2014).   In
2013, China opened its markets to British-based investors and allowed London-based asset managers to invest
directly in Chinese RMB - denominated stocks and shares.  Because of  this agreement, London-based asset
managers are the only ones within the West able to invest directly in this manner.
            Why are the Bank of  England and the UK government so keen to embrace the internationalisation of
the RMB? The Bank is expecting a precipitous increase in global RMB transactions over the immediate future,
calculating that China’s gross international investment position could increase from around 5 per cent to 30
per cent of  world GDP by 2025. Chinese capital flows are therefore likely to expand exponentially, with the
British economy likely to be more affected than others due to its, ‘large and open financial system’ and links
to China (BofE, 2013: 304-307).  
            London already accounts for 62 per cent of  RMB payments outside of  China, securing an important
‘first-mover’ advantage over New York. To further these ties between London and Chinese banks the Bank of
England’s Prudential Regulation Authority decided that Chinese banks should be allowed to open new
branches in the United Kingdom under the same rules that apply to other non-European Economic Area
banks (BofE, 2013: 307). This followed on from the pioneering issuance of  an RMB-denominated bond in
London by HSBC back in 2012. In sponsoring further RMB internationalisation the Bank explicitly
recognises and seeks to build upon London’s distinctive advantages.
[x]
            George Osborne enthusiastically led Britain’s growing engagement with China, giving the Treasury a
prominent role in cementing financial connections. In October 2014, HM Treasury presided over a landmark
event; the first foreign issuance of  a government sovereign bond denominated in RMB, worth around £300
million. The issuance was undertaken to finance Britain’s reserves, signalling a shift away from the traditional
policy of  only holding reserves in dollars, euros, yen, and Canadian dollars and demonstrating that the RMB is
seen as a future reserve currency. These steps were viewed as part of  the Coalition government’s ‘long term
economic plan to establish Britain as the centre of  global finance’. Commenting on the launch, Osborne
signalled the government’s continuing support for cementing London’s status as, ‘a major global centre for
trading and investing the Chinese currency’ (Treasury, 2014).
            Treasurysupport for expanding RMB business is part of  a wider strategy to embrace China’s rising
financial and economic power undertaken by the Conservatives since 2010. It was evidenced by the gaudy red
carpet treatment rolled out to Chinese premier Xi Jinping on an official state visit in late 2015. The strategy
includes controversial plans for China to take a major investment stake in the UK’s new nuclear power station
at Hinkley Point (Carrington, 2015), as well as the announcement of  over £30 billion of  bilateral Chinese
investment commitments to the UK (Spence, 2015). It was significant that Theresa May reaffirmed the
government’s commitment to the Hinkley plan soon after her appointment as Prime Minister in July 2016. At
the heart of  this broader set of  Anglo-Chinese economic entanglements is the deepening financial integration
between China and the City, which has ensured that London is, ‘fast becoming an outpost of  the Chinese
financial system’ (Blitz, 2015). Plans include a formal connection between the London and Shanghai stock
exchanges and future cooperation over the provision of  ‘Green Finance’ for China’s Belt and Road project
(Stafford, 2015; Madera, 2017).
            This is not, though, simply a case of  pre-crisis continuity. An increasing offshore orientation towards
Chinese finance, and the associated set of  political and economic linkages clustered around this strategy,
presents new risks to British capitalism. There are growing concerns about China’s domestic financial stability,
arising from the massive growth of shadow banking (Rabinovitch, 2014) and recent bouts of  stock market
turbulence and slowing growth. Any major crisis could seriously jeopardise the emergent consensus on RMB
internationalisation and capital account liberalisation. Additionally, appreciation of  the RMB as its
international role strengthens would have serious consequences for China’s export-led growth model, which
continues to rely upon a low value for the RMB vis-a-vis the dollar (Saull, 2012: 326). The flip-side of  this
equation is that depreciation in the dollar’s value, as its central international currency status is challenged,
could gravely weaken US demand for Chinese exports. Without domestic macroeconomic reform, capital
account liberalisation (the other side of  the RMB internationalisation coin) could have serious consequences
for Chinese financial stability and a future trajectory of  unfettered liberalisation may therefore prove
unrealistic (Yonding, 2014:  23). 
           
 
  
Conclusion: changing geographies of  City pre-eminence
 
 
This article has argued that the dominant institutional configuration within British capitalism, the City-Bank-
Treasury nexus, has been reinforced during the post-crisis conjuncture. Despite limited manufacturing
recovery, the most concerted institutional support has been oriented towards advancing the interests of  the
UK’s financial services sector. This reinforcement has occurred not as a structural inevitability, or exclusively
because of high-level UK government action, but also through a more proactive international role for the
Corporation. The Corporation’s active and continuous role in networking and market-making, stitching
together private and public actors, has been central to the development of  an offshore RMB business in
London. For all the discourse of  rebalancing under the Coalition, and the widespread recognition of  Britain’s
damaging dependency upon an oversized financial sector, it is precisely these characteristics that are
reaffirmed by the City-Bank-Treasury nexus’ new pivot to East Asia. By continuing the City’s entrepôt role
and maintaining the centrality of  the City-Bank-Treasury nexus within British economic policy-making, the
courting of  RMB business looks set to further intensify Britain’s uneven economic development by
perpetuating a finance-drive growth model configured around London and the South East. In this specific
sense, the post-crisis era has proved to be one of  overall continuity for British capitalism.
            Rebalancing in the post-crisis period has, as this article has suggested, taken on a primarily geo-
economic, rather than regional or sectoral form. The City’s entrepôt heritage and ‘offshore’ orientation have
provided the structural foundations for it to pragmatically adapt to the new opportunities presented by the
internationalisation of  the RMB. But that adaptation, as an active process of  forming new international
networks and designing new market and regulatory infrastructures, has drawn heavily upon the international
agency and para-state identity of  the Corporation. The long-term historical continuity of  the City’s offshore
model requires concerted agency to adapt to shifting international conditions, particularly after disruptive
crises. Recognising the unique political-economic agency of  the Corporation, and specifying more clearly its
relationship to the wider constituents of  the nexus, enables us to move beyond prevailing structural-
functionalist explanations. It allows a more dynamic and agent-centred framework for understanding the
enduring power and influence of  the City-Bank-Treasury nexus, demonstrating how the Corporation’s
peculiar para-state identity and international orientation allows it to coordinate private and public actors at
home and abroad. This function complements the more periodic and explicitly politicised, UK-China inter-
governmental relations that created the initial political space for the Corporation’s pivot to China. This revised
framework could be fruitfully applied to historical research on the development of  the City, which has
neglected the Corporation’s role.
There are also important lessons to be learned regarding the international significance of  the City-
Bank-Treasury nexus. The Corporation’s role in shaping London’s embrace of  Chinese finance demonstrates
the extent to which China’s intentions to promote its currency within the West are contingent not only upon
the supply-side potential of  its own domestic political economy (Otero-Iglesias & Vermeiren, 2015), but also
upon a specific combination of  demand-side forces within British capitalism. The City does, undoubtedly,
have long-standing comparative advantages as an offshore financial centre. But there is nothing natural or
inevitable about the concerted and active promotion of  a long-term growth strategy for the City of  London.
The institutional energy and resources poured into securing the City’s long-term global predominance
compare unfavourably with the serial neglect of alternative forms of  sectoral and regional development within
the UK political economy (Martin, 2015). The UK’s industrial policy, to the extent that long-term state
supported economic planning can be identified, is paradoxically geared towards financial services, rather than
manufacturing industry.
Considering the future, the preceding analysis provides some interesting clues as to what the UK’s
post-Brexit economic model might look like. The reinforcement of  the City’s influence within the UK state
via geo-economic rebalancing towards China was, as this article has shown, dependent upon concerted
political agency. There is therefore, no sense in which the outcome of  Brexit must be favourable towards the
interests of  the City of  London. To the extent that the City’s continued pre-eminence requires continued
agency and articulation, it is quite possible that if  the political will for this diminishes, particularly from within
the Treasury, then the City’s interests may well be harmed and its influence reduced. George Osborne’s
positive orientation towards China provided a crucial context within which efforts to embrace the RMB could
play out.
But, somewhat paradoxically, there is evidence that the policy initiatives once set in motion are
increasingly path-dependent. Once both sides have invested political will the reputational penalties of  a
reversal, for either the British or Chinese, are much greater. This is important to understanding the continuity
of  Theresa May and Phillip Hammond’s courtship of  Chinese finance (Interviewee A, 2016; Madera, 2017).
Additionally, the Corporation’s increasingly proactive post-crisis role is not confined to Asia. The Corporation
has stepped up international efforts since the referendum, attempting to establish itself  as a central and active
player in Brexit negotiations. This involves furnishing government colleagues and major European banks
(keen to maintain access to the City’s deep and liquid capital markets) with expertise and arguments around
the indispensability of  the City of  London to the EU’s capital markets. The Corporation plans to use its
gateway status for emerging Asian markets as a bargaining chip to secure the City of  London’s continuing
centrality to Europe (Madera, 2017).
What we may be likely to see then, in the coming years, is a doubling down on the strategy to
rebalance geo-economically away from Europe and towards the emerging markets of  China and the East.
Indeed, further steps to integrate the City with Chinese finance have been announced under May’s
government (Liu, 2017). But the Corporation will also seek to use the City’s growing relevance to Asia as
leverage to ensure continued European commitment to London’s markets. The City’s pragmatic geo-
economic rebalancing to Asia may, paradoxically,help conserve its European dominance. Britain’s membership
of  the European Union is coming to an end, but the City’s offshore orientation and with it Britain’s finance-
drive growth model, look set to endure.
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 Literature on the post-crisis City has predominantly focused upon regulatory issues(Johal, et al., 2014; Bell &
Hindmoor, 2015; Baker, 2015). An exception is Leila Talani’s (2011) work on the fortunes of  City hegemony after the
GFC.
[ii]
 The anonymous interviewee is a stakeholder in the RMB internationalisation process speaking under Chatham
House Rules of  anonymity. The interviewee is referred to as ‘Interviewee A’ in text.
[iii]
 Activities encompassed by the entrepôt role included trade financing, provision of  insurance for commodities
and transport and dealing in foreign exchange, among other services (Ingham, 1988: 47).
[iv]
 That this practice was possible in the City owed much to the specificity of  English common law vis-à-vis
continental law. Whereas the former prescribes only what is forbidden, and thus permitted the ad hoc
implementation of  activities and strategies that were not legislatively prohibited, the latter prescribes what is allowed,
and was therefore more restrictive in scope (Palan, 2006: 29).
[v]
 There are limits to the structural parallels between the component institutions of  the City-Bank-Treasury nexus
too. Although geographically proximate to the Bank and the Treasury, there are important differences between them.
The City’s institutions are comprised of  private employees, not civil servants. They have a different legal basis and
structure of  internal accountability, and financial services employees and executives are (particularly within large
international City firms) drawn from a more cosmopolitan pool than those of  government institutions.
[vi]
 The Remembrancer acts as a medium for communication between the City of  London Corporation and the
Parliament, with responsibility for advancing the City’s interests in Parliament regarding public legislation (Mathiason
& Newman, 2012).
[vii]
This has been enhanced by a wider national context of  fiscal austerity involving a huge reduction in public sector
employment and a slashing of  the government’s welfare bill (Kerr et al. 2011: 196; Taylor-Gooby, 2012: 61). Austerity
measures have reinforced the exceptionalism of  the City Corporation.
[viii]
 The presence of  UK banks with major business operations in China was very important to helping UK-Chinese
financial cooperation get started.  Of  the roughly 1.7 per cent of  the Chinese banking sector involving foreign
participation, between 0.8 to 0.9 per cent of  that is accounted for by HSBC and Standard Chartered, demonstrating
the structural dominance of  Anglo-Chinese banks in China’s international banking sector (Madera, 2017).
[ix]
 Both Grimstone and Rolet also served on the HM Treasury Financial Services Trade and Investment Board.
Rolet was a member of  David Cameron’s Prime Ministerial Business Advisory Group.
[x]
 These advantages stem from the time-zone of  London, which allows it to be a bridge between other global
trading zones, the globally respected (light- touch) regulatory tradition of the City and the considerable financial
expertise contained within. 
 
